



Friday, June 27 (joint CISEI)

09:15–10:00	Ilya Segal <i>Stanford</i>	The limits of auctions under ex-ante collusion
10:00–10:30	Francesco Fabbri <i>Princeton</i>	Attention hold-up
10:30–11:00	Martino Banchio <i>Bocconi</i>	Dynamic threats to credible auctions
11:30–12:00	Pierpaolo Battigalli <i>Bocconi</i>	Rationalizability and dominance in psychological games
12:00–12:30	Antonio Penta <i>UPF/BSE</i>	Incentive compatibility and belief restrictions
13:30–14:00	Giacomo Lanzani <i>UC Berkeley</i>	Nonlinear fixed points and stationarity: economic applications
14:00–14:30	Nicholas Yannellis <i>U of Iowa</i>	A rationalization of an infinitely repeated REE, 'Kreps meets Debreu'
15:00–15:30	Chiara Aina <i>UPF/BSE</i>	Weighting competing models
15:30–16:00	Paola Moscariello <i>Princeton</i>	Caution in the face of complexity

Saturday, June 28

10:00–10:30	Stephen Morris <i>MIT</i>	A strategic topology on information structures
10:30–11:00	Tommaso Denti <i>NYU Stern</i>	Understanding information acquisition through f-informativity and duality
11:30–12:00	Pietro Ortoleva <i>Princeton</i>	The politics of attention
12:00–12:30	Matteo Camboni <i>UW-Madison</i>	Spheres of Influence
13:30–14:00	Vasiliki Skreta <i>UT Austin/UCL</i>	Building an audience
14:00–14:30	Pietro Dall'Ara <i>Federico II</i>	Screening in digital monopolies
14:30–15:00	Jeffrey Ely <i>Northwestern</i>	Incentive compatible information design
15:30–16:00	Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch <i>U of Iowa</i>	Disagreement, information, and trade
16:00–16:30	Franz Ostrizek <i>Sciences Po</i>	The noise is in the mind

Sunday, June 29

10:00–10:30	Jacopo Perego <i>Columbia BS</i>	Facts and opinions: communicating with hard and soft Information
10:30–11:00	Denis Shishkin <i>UC San Diego</i>	Perfect bayesian persuasion
11:30–12:00	Niccolò Lomys <i>Federico II</i>	A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment
12:00–12:30	Roberto Corrao <i>Yale</i>	Matching with peer effects: efficiency vs. fairness