The Internal Labor Markets of Business Groups

Huneeus, Huneeus, Larrain, Larrain, and Prem

Discussion by Liu Yang

Conference on Finance, Labor and Inequity, 2019



Summary of the Paper

- Research Question
 - How do internal labor markets function in business groups?
- Empirical Strategy
 - Data: Employer-employee matched data from Chile
 - Economic Shocks: Firm level exposure to changes of export/import prices
 - Analysis: Examine how differential trade exposure affects labor mobility of firms within and outside of business groups
- Main Findings
 - There are active ILMs inside business groups
 - Workers flow from firms that receive negative shocks to firms that receive positive shocks
 - The internal reallocation mostly applies to top employees
 - Based on relative rank within the firm rather than the absolute wage distribution
 - Wages increase as employees move within the group



General Comments

- Very interesting paper!
 - Most of existing literature on business groups focus on internal capital markets
 - We know very little about ILMs inside business groups
- Cool data sets
 - Matched employer-employee data spanning the entire private sector of the economy
 - Business groups composed of both listed and private firms
- My discussion
 - The big picture
 - Empirical design and findings
 - Suggestions for future work



Comment #1: Business Groups vs. Conglomerates

How do business groups differ from conglomerates?

Conglomerates

One firm

Headquarter and divisions – clear hierarchy and full control

One stock price – common incentives




Comment #1: Business Groups vs. Conglomerates

How do business groups differ from conglomerates?

Conglomerates	Business Groups
One firm	A set of firms connected through a common controlling shareholder
Headquarter and divisions – clear hierarchy and full control	
One stock price – common incentives	







Comment #1: Business Groups vs. Conglomerates

How do business groups differ from conglomerates?

Conglomerates	Business Groups
One firm	A set of firms connected through a common controlling shareholder
Headquarter and divisions – clear hierarchy and full control	How much control does parent firm have? Across different layers of ownership?
One stock price – common incentives	Different firms with different stock prices



ILMs in Conglomerates

- ILMs in conglomerate firms (Tate and Yang (2015))
 - Greater labor mobility within conglomerate firms as compared to that in external labor markets
 - Workers are reallocated from low- to high-growth sectors
 - Workers from diversified firms experience higher wage changes when they move to industries operated by previous firms
 - Stronger effect for workers in high-skill industries



ILMs in Business Groups

- Would the ILMs forces be weaker in business groups as compared to conglomerates?
 - Do firms in the business group share similar culture, corporate strategy, managerial practices etc. (i.e. firmspecific human capital) that creates a wedge between internal and external moves?
 - Can firms within a business group integrate labor forces as easily as divisions within conglomerate firms?
 - To what extent can parent company direct to reallocate employees across firms in the group?
 - Why would one firm be willing to lose its star top employee to other firms within the group?

ILMs in Business Groups: Cross-Sectional Variation

- The effect would be stronger in business groups
 - with more similar firms (in industry, corporate strategy, culture, managerial practices etc.) that overlap in firm-specific investments
 - with firms that have more significant cross holdings so incentives are more aligned



Comment #2: Trade Shocks and Labor Mobility

- Pair-wise price shocks are defined as the differential exposure to export or import prices between destination and origin firms $(\Delta p_{dt}^k \Delta p_{ot}^k)$
- Sample: Firms that simultaneously export and import
- How selective is this sample?
 - Larger firms?
 - Better quality firms (esp. among exporters)?
 - A certain group of industries?

"Among firms that appear in both the UI and the trade dataset, 73% are only importers, 6% are only exporters and 21% do both" (Appendix A.1)

Comment #2: Trade Shocks and Labor Mobility

- How to separate general human capital about trade from firm-specific investments?
- Firms with growth potential in export markets may want to hire executives from other firms with knowledge about exports
- They are more likely to succeed if destination firms face declining demand



Comment #3: Top Employees and Wage Effect

- The effect is much stronger for top employees
 - Top 25, but more significant for Top 10

Table 3: Internal Labor Mobility Test

	All Workers		Bot. 25	Mid. 50	Top 25	Top 20	Top 10
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Δ Exports x Same BG	0.004 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.008 (0.005)	0.032** (0.013)	0.027* (0.014)	0.091*** (0.029)
Same BG	0.024*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.024** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.016)	0.052** (0.023)	0.016 (0.030)

- Who are these employees?
 - Engineers or managers?
 - What are the skills to be transferred? General managerial or firm-specific?

Comment #3: Top Employees and Wage Effect

- Wage increase is higher for moves in firms that belong to the same business group → support of transfer of intangible capital
- Business group firms pay higher wages than non-business group firms on average (size effect?)
 - The proper benchmark should be other similar BG firms.
 Alternatively, control for size differences between O and D firms
- Are internal moves more likely to be voluntary moves compared to external moves? Promotions?
 - Use moves in conglomerates as benchmark to control for voluntary/involuntary moves?



Comment #4: The Underlying Mechanism

- Benefits of ILMs in business groups
 - "Business-groups have an advantage over stand-alone firms because, by virtue of the control rights over multiple firms, they reduce the specificity of the investment. ... Simply put, intangibles can be used over many more assets"
- This is a very similar argument as what we have already know about ILMs in conglomerate firms.
- Can there be other mechanisms?



An Alternative Story: Asymmetric Information

- Firms have more information about employees from other firms in the same business group.
- They are more likely to tap into top employees (managers) from the same group when opportunities rise.
- Simply more information about the employees can generate the same pattern without common firm-specific human capital.
- Business groups offer a way for capable employees to move up the corporate ladder
 - Origin firms pay higher wages then destination firm
 - Effect in mobility is stronger when O has control over D
 - Employees move up in relative rank



Benefits of ILM in Business Groups

- We know that workers benefit from exposure to knowledge/skills in other sectors in conglomerate firms.
- It would be very cool to show that benefits of ILMs go beyond that in a much looser setting such as business groups – for example, through information asymmetry.
 - Do we see mobility between industry pairs that are often not common in the external labor markets?
 - Are effects robust in industry pairs that have little overlap in knowledge?



Conclusion

- Very interesting paper!
 - Nice topic, cool datasets, lots interesting empirical patterns
 - Highly recommend it
- My main suggestions
 - Focus on the unique feature of business groups
 - Explore how ILMs function differently between conglomerates and business groups
 - Emphasize on new insights we can learn from examining business groups
- I am looking forward to the next version!

