

The Cross-Section of Labor Leverage and Equity Returns

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This Paper

We show that:

- ① Labor-capital complementarity and wage smoothness results in labor leverage

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- ① Labor-capital complementarity and wage smoothness results in labor leverage
- ② Under the same conditions, labor leverage is an increasing function of labor share
- ③ Assuming a firm's exposure to aggregate shocks is larger than wage's exposure to shocks, the previous results imply a positive relation between labor leverage and expected returns.

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- ① Wages are smooth (yes, we know this, but we also find labor costs are smooth)

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- ② Labor and capital are strictly complements
- ③ A positive relation between labor leverage and expected returns
 - Measured by exposure to risk (betas)
 - Measured by average realized returns

This Paper

We calibrate a structural model:

- ① We match relevant moments

This Paper

We calibrate a structural model:

- ① We match relevant moments
- ② We find that the structural model matches many other moments

This paper and the literature

$$\lambda_m \beta_m^i$$

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$$\lambda_m$$

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“Fundamental” GE Models

Lucas (78);

... (*many others*)...

Danthine and

Donaldson (02)

...

This paper and the literature

$$\lambda_m \quad \lambda_m \beta_m^i \quad \beta_m^i [\rho_m^i, \sigma_i^{\text{RET}}]$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ① Note: We are not explaining anomalies
- ② We are pointing out the relevance for labor leverage in the cross-section of expected returns

What is Labor Leverage?

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	Cost (Dependent Variable)					
	Δlc	Δnlc	Δtc	$lc^g(\%)$	$nlc^g(\%)$	$tc^g(\%)$
$\Delta sale$	0.09*** (0.01)	0.72*** (0.03)	0.81*** (0.03)			
$sale^g(\%)$				0.43*** (0.16)	1.46*** (0.28)	1.07*** (0.12)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-sq. (%)	19.23	72.88	76.69	0.00	9.96	59.25
Obs.	8,173	8,173	8,173	8,173	8,173	8,173

What causes Labor Leverage?

- “Keynesian” mechanisms (i.e., driven by K-L relations):
 - Labor Risk Insurance: ...; Danthine and Donaldson (2002); Parlour and Walden (2011); Berk and Walden (2013); (Mindy) Zhang (2014); ...
 - Unions: Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011);...
 - Job Search and Wage Bargaining: Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2013); ...
 - Wage Rigidity: Favalukis and Lin (2015a,b); ...
- “Neo-Classical” mechanisms (i.e., technology driven):
 - L-K Complementarity: Gourio (2007) (now subsumed by this paper); Palacios (2012)
 - Labor Mobility: Donangelo (2014);

A Broad Definition of Labor Leverage

- Value Added: $Y[X_t, W_t]$
- Operating Profits: $\Pi[X_t, W_t]$

(X_t is TFP or price of good produced, W_t is wage rate)

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- Labor Leverage (ℓ)

$$\ell \equiv \frac{d\Delta\pi_t/d\Delta x_t}{d\Delta y_t/d\Delta x_t} - 1$$

(π , x , and y denote the logs of Π , X , and Y)

Link Between Labor Share and Labor Leverage

- Adding some structure:

$$Y_t = X_t F[K, L_t] \quad (\text{value added})$$

$$\Pi_t = \max_{L_t} \{X_t F[K, L_t] - L_t W_t\} \quad (\text{operating profits})$$

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- Labor Leverage: $\ell = \frac{(1-\gamma) \frac{S_t}{1-S_t} \left(1 - \frac{\partial \Delta w_t}{\partial \Delta x_t}\right)}{1 + \gamma \frac{S_t}{1-S_t} \left(1 - \frac{\partial \Delta w_t}{\partial \Delta x_t}\right)}$

$$\gamma \equiv \frac{F_K[K,L] F_L[K,L]}{F[K,L] F_{KL}[K,L]} \quad (\text{K-L Elasticity of Substitution})$$

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- Labor Leverage is increasing in Labor Share (S) when:
 - Wages are sufficiently smooth: $\frac{\partial \Delta w_t}{\partial \Delta x_t} < 1$
 - K and L are strictly complements: $\gamma < 1$

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Sidenote

- Model implies $\gamma = \frac{\partial \Delta y_t / \partial \Delta x_t - 1}{\partial \Delta \pi_t / \partial \Delta x_t - 1}$. Thus, labor leverage present if

$$\partial \Delta \pi_t / \partial \Delta x_t > \partial \Delta y_t / \partial \Delta x_t$$

- We will use this result to verify the conditions for labor leverage are met

Empirical Results

Measure of Firm-Level Labor Share

Two constructed measures of labor share:

- ① Main measure of labor share (LS):

$$LS_{it} \equiv \frac{XLR_{it}}{OIBDP_{it} + XLR_{it} + INVFG_{it} - INVFG_{it-1}}$$

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- ② Extended measure of labor share (ELS):

$$ELS_{it} \equiv \begin{cases} LS_{it} & \text{if } LS_{it} \text{ is non-missing} \\ \frac{LABEX_{it}}{OIBDP_{it} + LABEX_{it} + INVFG_{it} - INVFG_{it-1}} & \text{if } LS_{it} \text{ is missing,} \end{cases}$$

where $LABEX = EMP \times \text{Industry Average of } (XLR/EMP)$

Characteristics of Firms Sorted by Labor Share

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	LS	ELS	Log. L/K	B/M	Log. Size	Log. Asset	Tang.	Org. Cap.	Lev.	Prof.	Obs/ Year
All	0.62	0.65	3.01	0.62	6.48	6.69	0.31	1.23	0.50	0.34	1632
L	0.33	0.32	0.81	0.63	7.22	7.43	0.59	0.63	0.58	0.21	326
2	0.53	0.53	2.60	0.49	6.89	6.83	0.32	1.17	0.47	0.39	327
3	0.65	0.65	3.09	0.57	6.56	6.64	0.30	1.28	0.47	0.40	327
4	0.74	0.74	3.31	0.69	6.22	6.53	0.28	1.37	0.49	0.37	327
H	0.85	0.85	3.63	0.82	5.74	6.28	0.27	1.43	0.52	0.33	326

Cyclicalty of Labor Share

Validation of LS and ELS as Measures of Labor Leverage

	Proxy for Labor Share (S)					
	LS			ELS		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
gdp_t^g	-0.33*** (0.12)			-0.46*** (0.10)		
tfp_t^g		-0.43* (0.25)			-0.52** (0.23)	
$mklt_t^g$			-0.03* (0.02)			-0.06*** (0.02)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-sq. (%)	0.54	0.30	0.16	0.34	0.14	0.25
Obs.	13,508	13,508	13,508	75,720	75,720	75,720

Sensitivity of Operating Profit Growth to Shocks

Validation of LS and ELS as Measures of Labor Leverage

	S=LS			S=ELS		
	Aggregate Shock			Aggregate Shock		
	gdp^g	tfp^g	mkt^g	gdp^g	tfp^g	mkt^g
$shock_t$	1.96*** (0.23)	2.83*** (0.59)	0.18*** (0.05)	2.37*** (0.26)	2.79*** (0.67)	0.28*** (0.06)
$S_{it-1} \times shock_t$	1.15*** (0.21)	1.53*** (0.45)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.26)	0.90*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.01)
S_{it-1}	0.13*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-sq. (%)	10.89	9.11	6.80	8.59	6.98	7.21
Obs.	13,530	13,530	13,530	68,873	68,873	68,873

Elasticity of Profits and Value Added

Validation of LS and ELS as Measures of Labor Leverage

	Elasticities of profits and value added					
	$\hat{\Theta}^{\Pi}$			$\hat{\Theta}^Y$		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
gdp_t^g	9.29*** (0.17)			7.55*** (0.15)		
tfp_t^g		16.01*** (0.30)			12.50*** (0.23)	
MKT_t			1.18*** (0.02)			0.85*** (0.01)
R-sq. (%)	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.03
Obs.	54,406	54,406	54,406	54,406	54,406	54,406

Labor Share and Measures of Risk

Factor	Portfolio					
	L	2	3	4	H	H-L
Panel B: Average Betas of Portfolios Sorted on ELS						
MKT	1.05*** (0.07)	1.31*** (0.05)	1.37*** (0.05)	1.44*** (0.05)	1.52*** (0.07)	0.47*** (0.07)
SMB	0.73*** (0.13)	1.05*** (0.12)	1.21*** (0.13)	1.32*** (0.14)	1.56*** (0.13)	0.83*** (0.05)
HML	-0.43*** (0.15)	-0.67*** (0.21)	-0.60** (0.23)	-0.57** (0.23)	-0.55** (0.24)	-0.12 (0.10)
tfp^g	3.81 (2.41)	4.93* (2.44)	5.15** (2.26)	5.38** (2.39)	5.93** (2.43)	2.12** (0.80)
gdp^g	1.78 (1.93)	2.17 (2.13)	2.86 (2.00)	2.88 (1.96)	3.56 (2.20)	1.78** (0.83)
$wage^g$	0.84 (1.82)	0.18 (3.38)	4.02 (3.19)	3.14 (2.93)	3.66 (3.36)	2.83 (2.09)

Labor Share and Stock Returns

Excess Stock Returns (VW), Firms Sorted on Labor Share, 1963-2012

	Portfolio					
	L	2	3	4	H	H-L
LS_{t-2}	6.11*** (1.91)	7.80*** (1.90)	6.26*** (2.01)	5.73** (2.67)	10.18*** (2.46)	4.06* (2.20)
ELS_{t-2}	6.98*** (1.79)	7.36*** (1.78)	7.00*** (1.74)	7.47*** (2.11)	10.23*** (2.54)	3.25* (1.92)

Structural Model

If we have time...

Model Setup

Economic environment

- Pricing kernel:

$$\frac{d\Lambda_t}{\Lambda_t} = -r dt - \eta dZ_t^\lambda$$

- Wages:

$$\frac{dW_t}{W_t} = \mu_w dt + \sigma_w \rho_w dZ_t^\lambda + \sigma_w \sqrt{1 - \rho_w^2} dZ_t^w,$$

Model Setup

Output and Productivity

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 $\gamma = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$ K-L Elasticity of Substitution

- Productivity:

$$\frac{dX_t}{X_t} = \mu_x dt + \sigma_x \rho_x dZ^\lambda + \sigma_x \sqrt{1 - \rho_x^2} dZ^x.$$

Model Setup

Labor Share and Operating Profits

Labor Share dynamics:

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu_s dt + \sigma_{s\lambda} dZ^\lambda + \sigma_{sw} dZ^w + \sigma_{sx} dZ^x$$

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Strict L-K complementarity ($0 < \gamma < 1$) implies X-S relations:

$$\sigma_{sx} = -(1 - \gamma) \sigma_x \sqrt{1 - \rho_x^2} < 0, \quad (\text{LS lower in high productivity firms (X-S)})$$

$$\sigma_{sw} = (1 - \gamma) \sigma_w \sqrt{1 - \rho_w^2} > 0, \quad (\text{LS higher in high-wage paying firms (X-S)})$$

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+ Relative smoothness of wages implies

$$\sigma_{s\lambda} = -(1 - \gamma) (\rho_x \sigma_x - \rho_w \sigma_w) < 0, \quad (\text{LS is countercyclical (T-S)})$$

Model Calibration

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 - ② Study relation between endogenously determined LS and labor leverage and stock returns

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- SMM details:
 - Number of simulations per calibration pass: 10,000
 - Number of firms per simulation: 10,000
 - Number of years per simulations: 100
 - Number of periods per year: 12

Calibration Results

	Data				Model			
Panel A: Smoothness and Cyclicalilty of Macroeconomic Variables								
Variable	gdp ^g	tfp ^g	wage ^g	profit ^g	gdp ^g	tfp ^g	wage ^g	profit ^g
gdp ^g	1.000				1.000			
tfp ^g	0.862	1.000			0.983	1.000		
wage ^g	0.275	0.480	1.000		0.256	0.367	1.000	
profit ^g	0.628	0.621	-0.063	1.000	0.995	0.959	0.190	1.000
σ	0.030	0.017	0.015	0.105	0.030	0.024	0.020	0.036
Slope on gdp ^g *	1.000	0.494	0.141	2.222	1.000	0.784	0.171	1.183
Panel B: CS Std. Dev. of Firm-Level Value-Added Growth								
	0.131				0.151			
Panel C: Mean and Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation of Labor Share								
Mean	0.594				0.583			
σ	0.186				0.181			
Panel D: Elasticity of Substitution Between Labor and Capital								
	$\hat{\Theta}^{\Pi}$	$\hat{\Theta}^Y$	$\hat{\rho}$	EOS	$\hat{\Theta}^{\Pi}$	$\hat{\Theta}^Y$	$\hat{\rho}$	EOS
	10.19	5.68	-1.50	0.40	2.17	1.47	-1.45	0.405
Panel E: Sensitivity of Operating Profit Growth to GDP and TFP Shocks								
	gdp ^g		tfp ^g		gdp ^g		tfp ^g	
gdp _t ^g	1.96				1.88			
S _{it-1} × gdp _t ^g	1.15				0.80			
tfp _t ^g			1.53				2.17	
S _{it-1} × tfp _t ^g			2.83				0.84	
S _{it-1}	0.13		0.14		-0.01		-0.01	

Calibration Results

	Data	Model
Portfolio Sorts (Unlevered Stock Returns / Asset Returns)		
L	2.83	2.45
2	3.69	2.93
3	4.69	3.28
4	4.14	3.67
H	4.72	4.38
H-L	1.89	1.93

Conclusion

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- ① L-K Complementarity + Smooth Wages \Rightarrow Labor-Induced Form of Operating Leverage (“Labor Leverage”)
- ② Novel theoretically motivated measure of firm-level labor leverage
- ③ Evidence for the economic significance of labor leverage for cash flows and for equity returns